North Korea’s leadership is revising its South Korea strategy by closely analyzing public attitudes and NGO activity in the South. A confidential source in North Korea has revealed that the regime now views these shifts as crucial to its internal and external policies.
Specifically, the analysis is being led by the Institute of Enemy State Studies. This organization recently replaced the National Reunification Institute and now operates under Bureau 10 of the Workers’ Party. As a result, the institute’s main focus is to examine the South as a hostile state, not a unification partner.
Furthermore, the South Korea strategy centers around three key elements. First, the North is monitoring the changing views of young South Koreans toward unification. Second, it is tracking the weakening influence of South Korean NGOs. Third, it is using these trends to shape its internal propaganda.
According to the source, the institute believes younger generations in South Korea no longer feel a strong ethnic bond with the North. Therefore, this shift is seen as part of a larger trend toward “de-ethnification.” Leaders in Pyongyang interpret this not just as disinterest in unification but as a weakening of shared identity.
Moreover, North Korean officials argue this psychological distance allows them to divide South Korean society more effectively. By emphasizing these divisions, the regime can conduct psychological operations promoting a “two-state” concept. Consequently, this helps weaken support for unification from within the South.
In addition, the institute is evaluating the financial condition of human rights-focused NGOs. It has noticed a drop in activity, especially among those reliant on foreign funding. Officials believe this decline reduces external pressure on North Korea’s domestic policies.
As part of the South Korea strategy, the institute is already producing propaganda material. These internal campaigns stress South Korea’s instability and the growing gap between North and South values. Notably, the message targets North Koreans, suggesting that the South’s system is fractured and unworthy of admiration.
Looking ahead, the North plans to finalize this new strategy by October. It will continue observing political developments, youth sentiment, and NGO viability in the South.
In conclusion, North Korea’s updated South Korea strategy demonstrates a shift from reunification rhetoric to competitive hostility. Through calculated analysis and propaganda, the regime aims to strengthen internal cohesion and justify its hardline stance.
