Japan now faces mounting pressure to end Russian energy imports, as U.S. officials pressed Tokyo to shift its energy strategy. In Washington on October 16, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent met with Japanese Finance Minister Katsunobu Kato. During that meeting, Bessent stated that the United States expects Japan to stop buying Russian energy. This demand came alongside IMF and G20 meetings and highlights shifting global energy priorities.
According to Bessent, the talks included wider U.S. expectations for Japan to cut its reliance on Russian energy, particularly amid growing instability in Ukraine. In response, Kato confirmed Japan’s commitment to act in coordination with G7 partners and support a peaceful resolution. However, he stopped short of promising a complete end to imports.
Previously, Japan pledged to reduce Russian oil imports following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, it continues to receive limited shipments of Sakhalin Blend crude, which are linked to the Sakhalin‑2 LNG project. This facility still provides around 9 percent of Japan’s natural gas supply. Consequently, Japan faces a difficult balancing act between upholding sanctions and ensuring domestic energy security.
Between January and July 2025, Japan imported roughly 95,299 kilolitres of Russian crude oil. That figure accounts for just 0.1 percent of the country’s total crude imports. Nevertheless, the symbolic importance of even small volumes remains high, especially amid U.S. efforts to maintain unified sanctions. Recently, Japan also lowered its price cap on Russian crude to $47.60 per barrel, aligning more closely with G7 and European partners.
Moreover, energy analysts note that Japan has limited room to maneuver. Ties to Sakhalin projects are long-standing, and cutting them abruptly could disrupt supply. While Japanese utilities have begun diversifying LNG sources—with some deals already signed with the U.S.—a full-scale shift remains difficult in the short term.
For instance, a senior executive at JERA, Japan’s largest LNG buyer, stated that increasing U.S. LNG output presents new opportunities for diversification. Even so, the timing and scope of those contracts present practical limits on how quickly Japan can adjust its supply chain.
In the meantime, observers warn of potential diplomatic tension if Tokyo does not align with Washington’s expectations. Some analysts see this as part of broader U.S. efforts to tighten global pressure on Russia. Others argue Japan must prioritize energy stability over political alignment.
Looking forward, Japan will need to outline a clear strategy for ending its remaining Russian energy imports. The government must also determine how it will secure replacement sources—whether through more U.S. LNG, renewable expansion, or revisiting nuclear energy policy.
Ultimately, the ongoing debate over Russian energy imports reflects the challenge of balancing international alliances with domestic energy needs. Japan’s next steps could shape not only its relationship with the U.S. but also the broader global framework for enforcing energy-related sanctions.
